Analysis of Military Deterrence Strategies

The first time our military deterrence was seriously damaged— the military side,

which is the main pillar

of our deterrence—was, as I’ll explain, after the assassination of

Mr. Soleimani. They were prepared for us to deal them heavy blows.

And, to our utter disbelief, in the words of the late Leader,

we only slapped them, and

nothing else happened. Here, they knew what weapons we had.

They basically knew, and realized we had no will

to deter them. Here, they knew what weapons we had. They basically knew

and realized we had no will

to deter them.

When you have the will to deter, even conventional weapons can deter.

During our eight years of Sacred Defense,

conventional weapons provided thirty years of deterrence, because

we showed our resolve to defend. After the Soleimani incident, we

witnessed the assassination of Mr.

Fakhrizadeh, and this time we didn’t even slap them.

After that, we witnessed Israel’s thousand-cuts strategy.

They hit our drone base in Kermanshah. IRIB announced there had been an exchange.

Our missile sites, our sensitive sites,

the Zionists were hitting them with drones and other means

and we wouldn’t even announce it, and we wouldn’t respond at all.

It wasn’t that our armed forces couldn’t

respond or lacked the ability to respond.

The political establishment

was the obstacle, and kept— they kept saying,

“We won’t fall into the trap of war.”

Well, these events continued. This “thousand cuts” strategy reached the point

where their vessels

in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean were being hit by the Zionists,

with help from the Saudis.

And there, we eventually decided to, for example, respond to the regime, so to speak.

Our responses didn’t come close to

matching the enemy’s attacks at all,

which meant the Zionist enemy

realized very clearly that our deterrent resolve had weakened.

Even though we have capabilities,

including destructive capabilities, we don’t have the will

to use them. This continued after October 7.

That is, from

Mehr 1402 to Mehr 1402, uh…

April 2024,

They killed 32 of our prominent commanders in Syria, and we

practically gave the regime no response. We gave no response at all.

So what had to happen?

It got to the point where they officially struck our consulate.

In fact, they struck our embassy in Damascus.

Our response wasn't deterrent because it caused no

casualties for the regime. I'm describing what happened.

I'm not saying here that you should've done this, that you should've done that.

I'm saying what happened. No one should come tomorrow and say,

for example, if you're a military commander,

you say—

"Uh, why didn't we attack?" No, I'm just describing what happened.

From— Because our response wasn't deterrent, it led to

the assassination of Mr. Haniyeh in Tehran.

Look, it doesn't matter at all whether that

diplomatic guest of yours is Mr. A or Mr. B.

What matters is that the assassination

severely damaged our political prestige,

our national security

and our standing in the world and among our friends.

And the enemy, in fact, once again staged a show of its capabilities.

Well, what happened in the next round after that? The next round was that, in Mehr,

in 1403, we actually responded. I’ll refer to a

speech by the martyr Sayyed Hassan

Nasrallah at the Arbaeen ceremony,

his last Arbaeen speech in

the year

1403. He says we had intended, with our friends in

the Axis of Resistance, which now

I’m academically opposed to the term “proxy,”

because proxy is a term used by our enemies.

They are our allies. They really aren’t our proxies.

They’re not proxies.

There he says we had intended to coordinate

a response with our friends in the Axis.

That wasn’t possible, so we were forced to act alone,

and then he refers to it.

He says it’ll become clear later. Put that way, now, the gist may be—

Well, one assumption here is that

this was the understanding, and Hezbollah

for instance, understood that in response to the assassination,

if I’m not mistaken, it was Haj Fuad— Haj Fuad Shukr.

If, say, the Islamic Republic was supposed to— and, and, and…

…respond to the regime together. But, say, the Islamic

Republic, as an important member of the Axis,

wasn't ready,

didn't want to, couldn't. Whatever the reason, I don't know.

But that's Seyyed's interpretation. It's out there.

He says the Axis was supposed to act in coordination,

but we didn't act in coordination, so it was decided

that everyone would respond on their own. Let me make a little aside.

After October 7, part of the regime thought

the Islamic Republic would, in fact,

continue the path Hamas had started, and provide military support

but that didn't happen.

I'm not saying there was or wasn't an intention in Iran to do this—

that was their analysis.

Part of the regime saw it that way,

and took that to mean that we lacked the will.

That's one point. Look, with deterrence, the will

is much more important than the tools.